The nature of category formation is linked to the tasks applied to learn the categories. To explore this idea, we investigated how three different methods of category learning-Classification Learning, Inference Learning, and Mixed Learning (a mixture of the two)-affect the way people form categories. In Classification Learning, subjects learned categories by predicting the class to which an individually presented exemplar belonged given feature information about the exemplar. In Inference Learning, subjects learned categories by predicting a feature value of a stimulus given the class to which it belonged and information about its other features. In Mixed Learning, subjects received the Classification task on some trials and the Inference task on other trials. The results of two experiments and model fitting indicate that inference and classification, though closely related, require different strategies to be carried out, and that when categories are learned by inference or by classification, subjects acquire categories in a way that accommodates these strategies. ᭧ 1998 Academic Press
Categories serve a variety of purposes in-to assume that categories are formed in relation to specific tasks at hand. From this percluding classification, inference, communication, visual perception, and complex reasoning spective, the nature of category formation can be examined with respect to the tasks involved (Biederman, 1987; Gelman, 1986 Gelman, , 1988 Gentner, 1989; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990 ; in learning (Markman, Yamauchi, & Makin, 1997; Ross, 1996; Whittlesea, Brooks, & Harnad, 1987; Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Lassaline, 1996; Osher-Westcott, 1994) .
The purpose of this article is to examine son, Smith, Wilkie, Lopes, & Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981) . How do the link between the function of categories and the formation of categories. We will adwe acquire categories rich enough to subserve these functions? Research on categorization dress this problem by contrasting two of the fundamental functions of categories-inferhas been primarily concerned with the study of classification and has often neglected to ence and classification-in the context of category learning . Inference and address this question. Central to this approach is the assumption that classification learning classification play a critical role in the formation of natural categories. For example, the is a chief vehicle for forming categories. Categories, however, are used in widely different family resemblance structure of basic level categories is said to emerge in the process of circumstances and incorporate a variety of information. Thus, it may be more appropriate balancing specificity and generality associated with feature prediction (i.e., inference) and object classification (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, John between category learning and category for-tributes (e.g., supports affirmative action and favors reducing defense spending). In conmation and would provide insight into grasping the nature of category formation in an ex-trast, inference as we defined it is akin to the situation in which people predict an attribute perimental setting. In the following studies, we will examine (1) how inference and classi-of a person (e.g., supports affirmative action) based on a category label to which the person fication are carried out by using categories and (2) how the different mechanisms associated belongs and his other attributes (e.g., is a Democrat and favors reducing defense spendwith the two tasks alter the way people form categories when categories are learned by in-ing). Finally, we define category representation as the mental structure that specifies the ference or by classification.
In this paper, we first review several empiri-information that was acquired through interaction with the members of categories and ascal studies that highlight the distinction between inference and classification. Next, we sume that the specified information is obtained in the process of making classifications and describe three learning procedures-Inference Learning, Classification Learning, and inferences using categories. Mixed Learning and lay out how inference INFERENCE AND CLASSIFICATION and classification differ in the context of category learning and how these differences affect Despite the close relationship between inference and classification, several empirical the way people form categories. Then, we present two studies that investigate the impact findings reveal that people adopt different strategies to carry out the two tasks. In inferof the three learning procedures on category formation. Finally, we fit two mathematical ence, subjects tend to pay particular attention to relationships between exemplars within a models of classification-Medin and Schaffer's (1978) context model and Anderson's category (e.g., family resemblance among exemplars within a category or typicality infor- (1990, 1991) rational model-to examine further the distinction between the two tasks.
mation about exemplars in a category) (Lassaline & Murphy, 1996; Rips, 1975; Rosch et al. , Throughout this paper, we use the term category label to refer to a symbol that denotes 1976), while in classification subjects focus on feature information useful for dividing exema particular group of stimuli and the term category feature to mean a symbol that denotes plars into groups (Ahn & Medin, 1992; Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987) . In a characteristic of a stimulus. Classification, which involves the prediction of the category one study, for example, Lassaline and Murphy (1996) asked subjects to predict feature values label of a stimulus, is characterized in our experiments as a practice in which a stimulus of category exemplars given other feature values of the exemplars. Following this inference is placed into one of two groups when the attributes of the stimulus are known. Infer-task, subjects sorted a set of exemplars into categories. Subjects in this task were much ence, which involves the prediction of the value of a category feature, is characterized more likely to sort the stimuli on the basis of family resemblance than were subjects who in our experiments as a practice in which an attribute of a stimulus (i.e., a category feature) sorted the stimuli after making other judgments (who generally sorted the exemplars is predicted when the group to which the stimulus belongs (i.e., the category label) and other based on the values of a single feature dimension). As further support, Rips (1975) found attributes of the stimulus are known (for similar descriptions of inference, see Estes, 1994 ; that the likelihood that people predict that subordinate category members have a particular Murphy & Ross, 1994; Yamauchi & Markman, 1995) . For example, classification as we feature value is correlated with the typicality of that category member, suggesting that peodefined it is akin to the situation in which people predict a category to which a person ple make inferences based on family resemblance between exemplars (see also Malt, belongs (e.g., Democrat) by observing his at- Ross, & Murphy, 1995; Murphy & Ross, individually presented stimuli and receiving feedback after each response (Posner & Keele, 1994; Ross & Murphy, 1996 ; for the argument that people focus on a single target category 1968 , 1970 Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Malt, 1989; Nosofsky, 1986; Shepard, Hovland, & to make inferences) .
In contrast to inference, people tend to fo-Jenkins, 1961) . Similarly, in the inferencebased learning task (i.e., Inference Learning), cus on a small number of diagnostic features in classification (Medin et al., 1987 ; Nosofsky, subjects acquire categories incrementally by predicting feature values of individually preClark, & Shin, 1994; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & Mckinley, 1994; Tversky, 1977) . Sorting sented stimuli and receiving feedback after each response. For example, in the Classificatasks, which are quintessential classification tasks, provide evidence that subjects generally tion task (see Fig. 1a ), subjects are presented with a stimulus depicting the values of the attend to a limited number of diagnostic features that distinguish between categories when form, size, color, and position of the geometric figure and they predict the category label of they classify stimuli, as subjects in these tasks tend to group stimuli with a single salient fea-that stimulus. In the Inference task (see Fig.  1b ), subjects are presented with the values of ture even in the presence of a clear familyresemblance structure (Ahn & Medin, 1992 ; the size, shape, and position of the geometric figure along with the category label to which Medin et al., 1987) . Nosofsky and his colleagues (1994) also demonstrate that a compu-the stimulus belongs (e.g., Set A), and they predict the value of a missing feature (e.g., tational model based on simple rules and exceptions can account for people's performance the color). On different trials, subjects in Inference Learning predict the values of differon a wide variety of classification tasks. Other research suggests that different types of diag-ent features. In addition to these two conditions, we also included a ''Mixed Learning'' nostic features become salient in classification depending on the way that the stimuli are condition in Experiment 1, in which subjects classified stimuli on some trials, and made grouped (Tversky, 1977) . Although people may carry out a classification task in a number feature inferences on others.
Initially, no information about the categoof different ways, it seems reasonable to assume that focusing on diagnostic features is ries was given to subjects in our studies, so that they had to learn the two categories by one of many strategies that people adopt in classification. In the following studies, we will trial and error. The learning phase continued until subjects reached a criterion of 90% accuinvestigate why people use different strategies to make inferences or classifications and how racy in three consecutive blocks (24 trials) or until they completed 30 blocks (240 trials). 1 these differences affect the way people form categories. Following the learning phase, the nature of the category representation is probed on transfer OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS trials, which consisted of classifications and inferences of old stimuli that appeared during We developed an inference-based learning task (i.e., the Inference Learning task; see Fig. learning and new stimuli that did not appear during learning. In the transfer phase, all sub-1 and Estes, 1994; Yamauchi & Markman, 1995 for descriptions of similar inference jects received the same trials.
In our experiments, the stimuli were divided tasks) and compared it with a standard classification-based learning task (i.e., the Classifi-into two classes such that every exemplar shared three feature values with its correcation Learning task) in order to investigate the distinction between inference and classi-sponding prototype (A0 or B0) and one feature fication and their impact on category formation. In the standard classification-based learn-
FIG. 1. (a)
A stimulus frame for a classification trial; in a particular classification trial, a subject is given a figure whose form, size, color, and position are specified. Then, the subject is asked to predict the category label (Set A or Set B) of the stimulus. (b) A stimulus frame for an inference trial; in a particular inference trial, a subject is given a figure whose form, size, position, and the category label are specified. Then, the subject is asked to predict the color of the item.
value with the prototype of the other category ture (1, 1, 1, 0, ?) Å (form, size, color, position, category-label) in the exemplar A1, as- (Table 1) . We used simple stimuli consisting of geometric figures varying in their size, suming that the category label is just another feature (see Anderson, 1990) . Analogously, form, position, and color in order to focus on the effect of the learning procedures (see on each inference question (e.g., a question about the form of the stimulus A1), subjects Medin & Schaffer, 1978) .
In Classification Learning, subjects classi-predicted the value of a missing feature (e.g., the value of form) while the values of the fied the eight exemplars but not the prototype stimuli. In Inference Learning, subjects in-other three features and the category label were shown (e.g., the values of size, color, ferred all the feature values of stimuli except for the ''Exception-features.'' The Exception-position, and the category label). This question has a schematic structure (?, 1, 1, 0, 1) features, shown in bold italics in Table 1 , are the feature values of a category that are consis-Å (form, size, color, position, category-label) and is formally equivalent to the classification tent with the prototype of the other category. For example, the values of all the features in question (e.g., (1, 1, 1, 0, ?)), provided that the prediction of category labels and the preSet A are 1 except the values of the exception features which are 0. We did not include Ex-diction of category features are in principle compatible. The Exception-feature trials have ception-feature inferences in the learning phase and presented them only in the transfer a different structure. For example, the position inference for the stimulus A1 yields a schephase for two reasons. First, we excluded them to keep the Classification Learning con-matic structure (1, 1, 1, ?, 1), and is analogous to the classification of a prototype-(1, 1, 1, dition and the Inference Learning condition as equivalent as possible. On each classification 1, ?). Because prototype stimuli were not presented in Classification Learning, it is necesquestion, subjects predicted the value of the category label given the values of all the four sary to exclude Exception-feature inferences from Inference Learning to keep the two learnfeature dimensions (e.g., the stimulus A1 in Table 1 ). This question has a schematic struc-ing conditions equivalent. Second, we excluded Exception-feature egories. In this section, we would like to discuss how these two strategies can be translated questions from Inference Learning in order to examine the nature of feature information into our experimental setting and how they would influence the way people form categoused for making inferences in the transfer phase. On an Exception-feature inference trial, ries when categories are learned by inference or by classification. there are two possible choices, one that is consistent with the value of the prototype of the As a general rule, we assume that inferences guide subjects to focus on the target category category, and the other that is consistent with exception values of each category. For exam-(see Malt, et al., 1995; Murphy & Ross, 1994; Ross & Murphy, 1996) , while classification ple, on the Exception-feature question for the stimulus A1 (Table 1) , subjects see a stimulus often leads subjects to focus on a small number of diagnostic features that are useful to with form, size, color and the category label with a value of 1, and they infer the value of divide exemplars into groups. This distinction might have arisen because the two tasks are position (e.g., (1, 1, 1, ?, 1)). If they respond with the value of 0 (e.g., right), then they are associated with two different purposes of categories. Inference often requires the identificamaking a response consistent with the stimulus A1 (e.g., (1, 1, 1, 0, 1)), which is presented tion of an unknown property or the internal structure that is not readily apparent (Gelman, in feedback during learning. If they respond with the value of 1 (e.g., left), then they are 1986). Thus, focusing on the commonalities among exemplars within a category might be making a response consistent with the prototype (i.e., A0(1, 1, 1, 1, 1)) of the category, advantageous for inference. In contrast, classification is related to the operation of object which is not given in feedback during learning. Thus, the choice of feature values on these recognition and identification (see Nosofsky, 1986) . For this purpose, finding a salient featrials may provide some insight to assess the degree to which subjects use either family re-ture that differentiates between exemplars is useful. This focus is evident in sorting tasks, in semblance information or exception-feature information for inference.
which subjects consistently use a single salient feature to sort stimuli if no intervening tasks HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS are given prior to sorting (see Lassaline & Murphy, 1996; Markman & Makin, in press ). In the previous section, we described several empirical studies that are consistent with Although it is not clear exactly how sorting tasks speak to the classification task, it seems the idea that inference and classification involve different mechanisms; in inference sub-plausible to assume that this focus on a single salient feature will occur in classification tasks jects assess relationships between exemplars within a category while in classification they as well.
In sum, we assumed that categories learned focus on features that distinguish between cat-for inference or for classification will embody bilities-the probability that the feature value 1 is likely given the values of other features the characteristics that accommodate these two strategies. We argue that inference pro-and its category label [2a] , and the probability that the feature value 0 is likely given the motes the acquisition of category representations characterized with the prototypes of the values of other features and its category label [2b] . As in classification, they may also categories, while classification facilitates the formation of categories consistent with rules choose the feature value ''1'' if one of the two probabilities exceeds a particular threshold. In and exceptions or concrete exemplars. The following normative models illustrate these either case, subjects would assess at least one of the two conditional probabilities in an inferprocesses.
In Classification Learning, subjects would ence question of the stimulus A1 2 fulfill the classification task by assessing at
, F p 0 ) least one of two conditional probabilitiesthe probability that the response ''Set A'' is likely given the feature information about P(SetAÉStimulus_i) ) and the probability that the response ''Set B'' is likely P(
given the feature information about Stimulus_i (i.e., P(SetBÉStimulus_i)). For example, sub-
As the four equations show, the four condiStimulus_i), or vice versa. It is also possible tional probabilities that may be assessed in that subjects make a classification judgment inference and classification are in principle by setting a decision criterion. For example, identical if the category labels (C 1 and C 0 ) and they may choose ''Set A'' if P(SetAÉ the feature form (F f 1 and F f 0 ) are identical. Stimulus_i) is larger than, say, 0.5, and choose
The assumption that subjects at the begin-''Set B'' if P(SetAÉStimulus_i) is not larger ning of the learning phase attend to a diagnosthan 0.5. In either case, at least one of the tic feature in classification suggests that subfollowing two conditional probabilities would jects obtain a classification judgment primarbe assessed in the classification question of ily based on the value of the target feature, the stimulus A1 while ignoring information about other features that are not attended. To translate this
process, the feature values F s1 , F c1 , F p 0 can be removed from Eqs.
[1a] and [1b], resulting in
Eqs.
[3a] and [3b], if, for example, subjects focus on the feature form
where C 1 and C 2 stand for the category labels
[3b] with the values 1 and 2, respectively, and F f 1 , F s1 , F c1 , and F p 0 stand for the feature values Similarly, the assumption that subjects fo- Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986; . cus on the target category in inference can be translated into Eqs.
[4a] and [4b] provided that In contrast to classification, the focus on the target category promotes the acquisition the focus on the target category is made by the focus on the category label (see Murphy & of categories consistent with family resemblance or prototypes of the two categories. In Ross, 1994 , for the argument of a focus on a single target category in inference, and see this setting, the two category labels represent the two groups unambiguously, so that subYamauchi & Markman, in preparation; for an argument for a focus on the category label in jects can focus on the category labels and link them directly to feedback C 1 and F f 1 in this inference) example). No Exception-feature questions are presented to subjects in Inference Learning,
[4a] so that subjects may associate the category label with the prototype (e.g., A0(1, 1, 1, 1)). As a result, Inference Learning should facili-
tate the acquisition of category representations consistent with prototypes or family resemblance between members of each category. As in classification, the feature information F s1 , F c1 , F p 0 is unattended or not used for the In natural settings, if inferences are made to a large number of exemplars and to a variinference judgment.
Our argument is that the difference in focus ety of feature dimensions, feature values that people associate with the category label between inference and classification will ultimately lead to the acquisition of distinct cate-should be close to the average feature values of all the exemplars within the category as the gory representations, even if the stimuli presented in each learning procedure convey number of inferences increases (see Hintzman, 1986) . If the exemplars of a category are roughly the same amount of information about the relationship of the features to the catego-clustered by a family resemblance structure, the average feature values that subjects link ries (see the previous section). In this category structure, none of the features are perfectly with the category label can be approximately the prototype of that category. 3 As a consecorrelated with the category division. Therefore, the focus on any single feature is not quence, making inferences would promote the formation of categories consistent with the sufficient to predict the category division more than 75% of the time. Thus, subjects in Classi-prototypical values of the categories. In contrast, the focus on a diagnostic feature, which fication Learning need either to store some specific cases, such as the case in which the may be adopted in classification, would impede the extraction of prototypes even when feature value F f 0 is linked to the category label C 1 , or to employ a disjunction rule (e.g., sub-classification is made to a large number of exemplars. If the focus on a diagnostic feature jects make the response ''Set A'' if at least two of three features have the values 1, other-is effective for prediction, then there is no need to attend to other features. If the focus wise they make the response ''Set B''). In either case, this would induce subjects to at-is not very effective for prediction, then one can look for another diagnostic feature or emtend to concrete exemplars or exception-features in Classification Learning along with a ploy some decision rules (e.g., conjunction or disjunction rules). Thus, classification would limited number of diagnostic features. Consequently, Classification Learning facilitates the obscure information about other features that acquisition of category representations characterized by the information about salient fea-are not focused, which would in turn deter the given the assumption that Inference Learning promotes the formation of categories congruextraction of the prototype of a category.
This reasoning leads to three basic predic-ent with family resemblance information, subjects in Inference Learning should be the best tions in our experiments. First, the idea that inference is in general linked to the assess-on the inference transfer task. Analogously, subjects in Mixed Learning should be better ment of family resemblance within a category will be examined by observing subjects' re-both in classification transfer and in inference transfer to the extent that they receive Infersponse-patterns in Exception-feature inferences. In particular, we predict that subjects ence Learning trials and Classification Learning trials. This pattern of data should emerge in the three learning conditions should respond with prototype-feature values more of-regardless of subjects' familiarity with Inference or Classification Learning tasks. ten than with Exception-feature values. In the category structure employed in our experiIn the two experiments reported below, we will test these predictions. In Experiment 1, ments (Table 1) , the two prototypes-A0(1, 1, 1, 1) and B0(0, 0, 0, 0)-recapitulate the subjects learn the two categories with one of three learning procedures-Inference Learnfamily resemblance structure of the two categories. If the judgment involved in inference ing, Classification Learning, or Mixed Learning, and we examine the distinction between requires assessing the feature values that exemplars of a category have in common (e.g., inference and classification by focusing on subjects' performance on transfer questions. family resemblance among category exemplars), then subjects in all three learning con-In Experiment 2, we will test directly if the different strategies employed in the two learnditions will exhibit a tendency to select the feature values that are shared by many of ex-ing tasks can specify the formation of categories. emplars in a category (e.g., prototype-feature values) rather than the features values that are shared by exemplars of the other category EXPERIMENT 1 (e.g., Exception-feature values).
Method Second, this tendency may be reduced for subjects in Classification Learning as comParticipants. Participants were 77 undergraduates at Columbia University who participared to subjects in Inference Learning. If classification induces attention to a small pated in the experiment for course credit. The data from 4 subjects were removed from the number of diagnostic features and some specific exceptions, then subjects in Classification analyses because these subjects failed to follow the instructions, and the data from 1 subLearning may be less likely to respond with prototype-feature values than may subjects in ject were lost due to a coding error. In all, the data from 72 subjects (24 per condition) were Inference Learning given Exception-feature questions.
analyzed. Materials. Stimuli used for this experiment Third, the hypothesis that the two learning procedures produce different category repre-were like those used in the first experiment of Medin and Schaffer's (1978) studies. They sentations can be tested by examining subjects' overall performance for the transfer were geometric figures having four feature dimensions-form (circle, triangle), color (red, tasks. Given the assumption that Classification Learning promotes the acquisition of category green), size (large, small), and position (left, right) (Fig. 1) . Each stimulus was bounded by representations consistent with rules and exceptions or concrete exemplars, subjects in a 20.3 1 17.4 cm rectangular frame drawn with a solid black line on the computer screen. Classification Learning should be the best on classification transfer tasks, assuming that cat-
The structure of the two categories is illustrated in Table 1 (see Medin et al., 1987) . A egories formed in Classification Learning facilitate classification judgment. Similarly, single stimulus set was drawn containing an arbitrary assignment of dimension values of 0 they predicted other dimensions (form, size, or position). Subjects responded by clicking and 1 in the stimulus design. For form, the value of 0 was triangle, and the value of 1 one of two labeled buttons with the mouse.
For each stimulus, the location of the correct was circle. For size, the value of 0 was small, and the value of 1 was large. For color, the choice was randomly determined. The Mixed condition was a mixture of classification and value of 0 was green, and the value of 1 was red. For position, the value of 0 was right, and inference blocks. Half of the blocks in this condition were classification and half were inthe value of 1 was left. All subjects saw the same stimulus set. The eight stimuli (A1-A4, ference. The order of the blocks was determined randomly for each subject.
4 B1-B4) were divided into two categories. The category exemplars share three features with Initially, no information about the category division was given to subjects, and so subjects the prototype of that category and one feature with the prototype of the other category. Thus, had to guess. Following each response, feedback was provided in a stimulus frame that no single feature can unambiguously determine the category division.
depicted the correct response; the stimulus and the feedback remained on the screen for 3 s Procedure. The basic procedure of the experiment involved three phases-a learning after their response. The stimulus frames that depicted correct responses were identical in phase, a filler phase, and a transfer phase. In the learning phase, subjects were randomly both classification and inference tasks. In Classification Learning, subjects saw all eight assigned to one of three experimental conditions-Classification, Inference, and Mixed. exemplars but not the two prototypes (i.e., A0(1, 1, 1, 1) and B0(0, 0, 0, 0)). In Inference For all the three conditions, subjects continued in the learning phase until they performed Learning, subjects answered all the feature questions for each stimulus except for the Exthree consecutive blocks with a combined accuracy of 90% or until they completed 30 ception-feature questions.
Following the learning trials, all subjects in blocks (240 trials). A classification block consisted of presentations of eight exemplars. One the three learning conditions participated in the same transfer tasks, which followed a 10-inference block included inferences of all four feature dimensions. One block of the Mixed min filler task, where subjects judged the pronounceability of nonsense words. In the condition was either a classification block or an inference block. In the three conditions, transfer phase, subjects were first given classification transfer tasks followed by inference every exemplar appeared once in the feedback of each block. The order of stimulus presenta-transfer tasks. In this phase, the instructions specifically asked subjects to make their decition was determined randomly.
In the Classification Learning condition, sions based on the categories learned during the learning phase when the values of the four subjects were shown one of the eight stimuli and were asked to indicate the category to features were given. In the classification transfer task, as in the classification learning task, which it belonged by clicking a button with the mouse (Fig. 1a) . In the Inference Learning subjects were asked to indicate the category label of a stimulus based on the categories condition, subjects made inferences of one of four features while its category label and the they learned. In the inference transfer task, as in the inference learning task, subjects were remaining three feature values were depicted in the stimulus frame. For instance, in Fig. 1b, asked to indicate the value of the missing feasubjects were given a stimulus frame containing the form, size, and position of the item ture of the stimulus based on the categories 30 block maximum. 6 In all, 22 subjects reached the criterion in the Inference Learning they learned when the category label to which the stimulus belonged and the values of other condition, 23 in the Classification Learning condition, and 20 in the Mixed Learning confeatures of the stimulus were shown. No feedback was given during transfer. First, subjects dition. First, we measured the number of blocks that were required to reach the criterion classified the eight exemplars that appeared in the learning phase as well as two new proto-to examine relative difficulty of the three learning conditions. In this measure, the three type stimuli (A0 and B0) that were not presented during the learning phase. Immediately learning conditions were significantly different: F(2, 62) Å 10.62, MSE Å 32.1, p õ after each classification, subjects indicated whether they had seen the stimulus during the 0.001. 7 In particular, subjects in Inference Learning (m Å 6.5) required fewer blocks to learning trials. 5 The order of stimulus presentation for the ten stimuli was determined ran-reach the criterion than did subjects in Classification Learning (m Å 12.3), or in Mixed domly. Following the classification task, subjects proceeded to the inference transfer task. Learning (m Å 14.2); for both comparisons, t ú 4.0, p õ 0.001(Bonferroni). The differThey performed all possible feature inferences including Exception-feature inferences (32 in-ence between subjects in Classification Learning and subjects in Mixed Learning was not ferences in total). The order of stimulus presentation for inference transfer was deter-statistically significant, t(41) Å 0.96, p ú 0.10.
In the transfer phase, the proportions of cormined randomly. The entire experiment took 30 to 40 min. rect responses exceeded a chance level in every dependent measure of the three learning Design. There were three between-subjects learning conditions: Inference, Classification, conditions; t ú 2.5, p õ 0.05, implying that the Classification Learning task and the Inferand Mixed. Five dependent measures served for our analyses. First, we examined the num-ence Learning task were capable of producing category representations flexible enough to be ber of subjects who reached the 90% accuracy criterion, and the number of blocks needed to used with the transfer task that was not given during learning. As predicted, performance of reach the criterion in the learning phase. The rest of the measures encompassed the transfer subjects in each condition was generally better when the learning task matched the transfer tasks: the proportion of correct classifications of old exemplars, the proportion of correct task. The three learning procedures differed in the classification transfer of old stimuli; classifications of the prototypes, the proportion of correct inferences to old exemplars, Classification, m Å 0.92; Mixed, m Å 0.88; Inference, m Å 0.77; F(2,62) Å 8.42, MSE Å and the proportion of inferences to Exceptionfeatures consistent with the prototype features 0.02, p õ 0.001 (Fig. 2a) . Subjects in Classification Learning were more accurate than of the category. subjects in Inference Learning; t(43) Å 4.22, p õ .001. Subjects in Mixed Learning also Results and Discussion performed better than did subjects in Inference All dependent measures were analyzed with Learning in the classification transfer of old one-way ANOVAs. For these analyses, we stimuli, although this difference was only marused the data from only those subjects who reached the 90% accuracy criterion before the 6 Since analyses of the data from all the subjects (including subjects who did not reach the 90%-above accuracy criterion) showed basically the same patterns as ob- 5 We collected the recognition performance data of the served in the subjects who reached the criterion, we report only the data obtained from the subjects who reached the subjects on an exploratory basis. Because this experiment was not designed to survey recognition performance (i.e., criterion in the following two experiments. 7 The number of blocks shown in these results includes there were only 2 new stimuli out of 10 stimuli), we will not discuss this task further.
three consecutive blocks used to assess the criterion.
FIG. 2. (a)
The classification transfer performance for old stimuli and prototype stimuli of Experiment 1. (b) The inference transfer performance for old stimuli and Exception-feature stimuli of Experiment 1. For the Exception-feature inferences, the proportion that subjects responded with the prototype stimuli was reported (i.e., prototype-accordance responses). ginally significant; t(43) Å 2.49, p õ 0.06. view that assessing family resemblance information is critical for inference. The three conThe performance for classification of prototypes did not differ reliably between condi-ditions differed significantly in their preference for prototype-accordance responses, F(2, tions; Classification, m Å 0.96; Inference, m Å 0.96; Mixed, m Å 0.93; F(2,62) õ 1, MSE 62) Å 3.34, MSE Å 0.08, p õ 0.01. As predicted, the tendency to respond consistent with Å 0.04. In inference transfer of old stimuli, subjects in the three learning conditions dif-prototype-feature values (i.e., prototype-accordance responses) was reduced significantly fered in their performance (Fig. 2b) To summarize, three aspects of the results of Experiment 1 are in accord with the hypothThese results imply that the category representations obtained by each learning procedure esis that subjects employ different strategies to make inferences or classifications. First, on are specific to each learning condition to some extent while maintaining some level of gener-Exception-feature questions, subjects in all the three conditions responded with prototypeality.
The response-patterns observed on Excep-feature values more often than with exceptionfeature values. The results imply that checking tion-feature transfer trials were also consistent with the view that inference promotes the as-family resemblance information is critical in inference. Second, this tendency was reduced sessment of family resemblance while classification increases attention to a few diagnostic in subjects given Classification Learning, suggesting that classification tends to induce atfeatures and exceptions. First, subjects in all the three conditions typically responded with tention to exception-feature values to a larger degree than does inference. Third, subjects' feature values that were in accord with the category prototypes (i.e., prototype-accor-performance on the transfer tasks was generally better when the learning task and the dance responses); Inference, m Å 0.86; Mixed, m Å 0.76; Classification, m Å 0.64; for all transfer task matched, indicating that the representation acquired in each learning proceconditions, t ú 2.5, p õ 0.03, confirming the dure may be specific to the corresponding condition, provided that Inference Learning leads to the acquisition of a category represenlearning task, while these representations retain a minimum level of flexibility to cope tation consistent with family resemblance information, and that Classification Learning rewith both inference and classification transfer tasks. In particular, the finding that subjects sults in the acquisition of a category representation consistent with rules and exceptions or in Mixed Learning excelled both in inference and classification transfer tasks seems to sug-concrete exemplars.
We hypothesized earlier that Classification gest that the combination of the two learning tasks produces a category representation rich Learning facilitates the formation of categories involving to rules and exceptions or conenough to deal with both inference and classification transfer tasks at a high level of accu-crete exemplars, while Inference Learning induces the acquisition of categories in accorracy.
These results are consistent with the hy-dance with the information about family resemblance within a category. Because a pothesis that subjects employ different strategies to deal with the inference task and with small number of features assessed in Classification Learning would not be sufficient to anthe classification task, though they are not conclusive to rule out alternative interpreta-swer the inference questions on all four feature dimensions, subjects in the Classification-first tions. In particular, subjects' familiarity with each transfer task might have contributed to condition may need to store extra rules and exceptions or concrete exemplars to cope with the observed results of Experiment 1. For example, the different levels of prototype-accor-the subsequent Inference Learning trials. By contrast, prototype information (e.g., A0(1, 1, dance responses might have emerged in subjects of Inference Learning and of Classifica-1, 1) and B0(0, 0, 0, 0)) processed in Inference Learning is also useful for dividing the exemtion Learning because they differ in terms of their familiarity with the inference transfer plars into the two classes in this setting, so that the representation obtained from Infertask.
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to rule out ence Learning can be applied in the subsequent Classification Learning task without this possibility and to contrast directly the characteristics of category representations modifying its characteristics extensively. As a consequence, we predict that learning the produced in Inference Learning and in Classification Learning. In this experiment, we had categories starting from Inference and followed by Classification should be less cumsubjects participate both in Inference Learning and in Classification Learning in sequence but bersome than learning the categories in the reverse order. In other words, if Inference in different orders. One group of subjects learned the categories by the Inference Learn-Learning produces a category representation consistent with family resemblance informaing task first, and then they learned the same categories by the Classification Learning task tion, and if Classification Learning produces a category representation consistent with rules (i.e., Inference-first condition). The other group of subjects learned the same categories and exceptions or concrete exemplars, subjects should require fewer trials to reach the by the Classification Learning task first, and then they learned the same categories by the two learning criteria in the Inference-first condition than in the Classification-first condition. Inference Learning task (i.e., Classificationfirst condition). As in Experiment 1, subjects Following the same line of logic, given Exception-feature questions, subjects in the Infercontinued in one learning task until they reached the 90% accuracy criterion or they ence-first condition should choose prototypeaccordance features more often than should spent 30 blocks (240 trials) in total. In this setting, we predict that subjects will find it subjects in the Classification-first condition because subjects in the Inference-first condieasier to learn the categories in the Inferencefirst condition than in the Classification-first tion would form categories according to fam- of $6.00. 8 The data from 9 subjects were removed from the analyses-6 for failing to complete the experiment, 2 due to a coding error, and 1 for not following the instructions. measures as used in Experiment 1 served for Thus, we were left with 48 subjects (24 per analyses. condition).
Results and Discussion Materials. The stimuli used for this experiment were identical to those used in ExperiTo assess the relative difficulty of the two ment 1.
learning orders, we first examined the number Procedure. The procedure for this experi-of blocks required to reach the learning critement was identical to that employed in Experi-rion. The data are summarized in Table 2 and ment 1 except for the following key manipula-were analyzed with a 2(Learning order-Intion. In the present experiment, all the subjects ference-first vs Classification-first) 1 went through both Classification and Infer-2(Learning type-Inference vs Classification) ence Learning, but in different orders. Half of ANOVA. In all, 20 subjects in the Inferencethe subjects were assigned to the Inference-first condition and 18 subjects in the Classifirst condition performing the Inference fication-first condition reached both criteria. Learning task first until they reached the learn-As predicted, learning the categories starting ing criterion-above 90% accuracy over three from Inference was easier than learning the successive blocks (24 trials)-or they com-same categories starting from Classification. pleted 30 blocks (240 trials). After reaching Subjects in the Inference-first condition rethe criterion in Inference Learning they per-quired fewer learning blocks to reach the criformed Classification Learning until they terion in both tasks (m Å 15.7) than did subreached the same learning criterion or com-jects in the Classification-first condition (m pleted 30 blocks of trials. The other half of Å 21.7); F(1,36) Å 5.01, MSE Å 34.8, p õ the subjects (i.e., the Classification-first condi-0.05. The results are consistent with the idea tion) received the two tasks in the reverse that Inference Learning and Classification order.
Learning produce distinct category represenDesign. The experiment was designed with tations. The interaction between Learning ora between-subject factor consisting of two lev-der (Inference-first vs Classification-first) els: Inference-first (Inference learning fol-and Learning type (Inference vs Classificalowed by Classification learning) and Classi-tion) was not significant, F(1,36) Å 1.41, fication-first (Classification learning followed MSE Å 39.64, p ú 0.10. To examine the by Inference learning). The same dependent effect of the two learning orders further, we compared the number of blocks required to reach the learning criterion as a function of blocks to reach the learning criterion if Clas-with our prediction, subjects in the Inference-first condition made Exception-feature sification Learning was given after Inference Learning (m Å 7.8) than if it was given be-inferences in accordance with prototype-feature values more often (m Å 0.86) than did fore Inference Learning (m Å 12.5); t(36) Å 2.64, p õ 0.05. In contrast, in Inference subjects in the Classification-first condition (m Å 0.54), t(36) Å 2.96, p õ 0.01, implying Learning, the number of blocks required to reach the learning criterion did not differ sig-that category representations formed in the Inference-first condition and those in the nificantly whether Inference Learning was given before Classification Learning (m Å Classification-first condition differed significantly in the degree that family resem-7.9) or it was given after Classification Learning (m Å 9.2); t(36) Å 0.62, p ú 0.10. blance information was incorporated into their representations. The results suggest that Inference Learning helped subjects to cope with the subsequent Further support for this interpretation was found in a subject-analysis in which 17 out Classification Learning task while Classification Learning did not help the subsequent of 20 subjects in the Inference-first condition made responses in accordance with the proInference Learning task.
The results obtained from transfer perfor-totype-feature values more than 75% of the time, and only 3 out of 20 subjects made mance, which are summarized in Fig. 3 , were also consistent with the idea that Classifica-responses in accordance with exception-feature values more than 75% of the time. In tion Learning and Inference Learning yield distinct categories. Although subjects in the contrast, 8 out of 18 subjects in the Classification-first condition chose feature values in two learning orders did not differ in the classification of old stimuli -Inference-first (m accordance with prototypes more than 75% of the time, and 6 out of 18 subjects made Å 0.95), Classification-first (m Å 0.91), t(36) Å 1.36, p ú 0.10 -and in the classification responses in accordance with exception-feature values more than 75% of the time. Thus, of prototype stimuli -Inference-first (m Å 0.88), Classification-first (m Å 0.81), t(36) the results of the Exception-feature inferences reveal that subjects in the two learning Å 0.64, p ú 0.10 -, subjects in the Inference-first condition (m Å 0.95) were signifi-orders differed in the proportion of prototype-accordance responses. cantly more accurate in making inferences to old stimuli than were subjects in the ClasTo examine further whether subjects in the Classification-first condition learned the catsification-first condition (m Å 0.88), t(36) Å 2.89, p õ 0.01. More importantly, consistent egories by augmenting single feature infor-mation to cope with inference questions, we in Inference Learning and in Classification
Learning is a result of a link between encodconducted a post hoc analysis for the inference transfer of old stimuli. In particular, we ing and retrieval tasks. In Inference Learning, subjects answered inference questions of all measured the standard deviations of correct responses of four feature dimensions, taking the four feature dimensions whereas in Classification Learning subjects answered questhe data from individual subjects as random variables. The rationale for this analysis is tions about the category labels only. On this basis, the observed distinction between Inferthat subjects selectively attending to a small number of features will show high variability ence Learning and Classification Learning may be an artifact of this experimental setting of correct responses over the four feature dimensions, exhibiting accurate performance because what is learned in the two learning procedures can be no more than a link befor one feature dimension but not for the others. In contrast, subjects attending to four tween the encoding task and the retrieval task (Estes, 1976 (Estes, , 1986 Medin & Schaffer, 1978 ; feature-dimensions equally would display the same level of performance in all the four Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973;  see also Roediger, 1989) . This explanation, dimensions, resulting in less variability between feature dimensions. Subjects exhib-though plausible, cannot account for why subjects in the two learning orders exhibited ited higher variability in the Classificationfirst condition (m Å 0.14) than in the Infer-drastically different transfer performance when the order of the two learning proceence-First condition (m Å 0.08); t(36) Å 2.69, p õ 0.05. The results of this analysis dures was changed. In this study, all the subjects in the two conditions learned the same provide additional support for our hypothesis that classification makes use of a small num-categories by the same tasks -Inference Learning and Classification Learning -with ber of diagnostic features.
Taken together, these results of Experi-the identical stimuli. Nonetheless, subjects acquired different categories if the two learnment 2 are consistent with the view that subjects form different category representations ing procedures were given in different orders.
It is difficult to see how a simple link between in the two learning orders, supporting the hypothesis that Classification Learning and encoding and retrieval procedures caused the disparity between the two learning orders. By Inference Learning give rise to the acquisition of distinct category representations. In the same token, the results of Experiment 2 cannot be explained by subjects' familiarity Classification Learning, subjects seem to obtain a category representation congruent with with the corresponding learning task. We argue that the specific mechanisms tied to ina small number of diagnostic features and exceptions, while in Inference Learning, ference and classification were one of the main determinants of the observed results in subjects tend to obtain a category representation congruent with family resemblance in-the two learning orders. formation. Because the information about a FITTING CATEGORIZATION MODELS diagnostic feature and exceptions is not sufficient to answer all inference questions, and
In the two experiments, we have examined the distinction between inference and classibecause the information about family resemblance between exemplars is suitable to deal fication solely by contrasting the effect of the three learning procedures. The results of with both inference and classification questions, subjects required more trials to reach the two experiments are consistent with the idea that Inference Learning and Classificathe learning criterion in the two learning tasks when categories were learned by classi-tion Learning lead to the formation of distinct categories, supporting the view that fication first followed by inference than by the reverse order. subjects employ different strategies to make judgments related to inference or classificaSome may argue that the effect observed tion. This conclusion can be tested further looked for the minimum values of the sum of squared deviation between predicted and by comparing subjects' performance within each learning condition. That is, if our argu-observed values (SSE). The data from classification transfer and inference transfer ment is sound, performance for inference transfer tasks and performance for classifi-were examined separately in each learning condition. There were 10 data points in the cation transfer tasks should differ considerably even within a single learning condition. classification transfer of Experiments 1 and 2, and there were 32 data points in the inferWe tested this idea by fitting existing models of classification to the data obtained from ence transfer of Experiments 1 and 2. inference transfer tasks as well as from clasFitting the Context Model and the sification transfer tasks. If inference is carRational Model ried out by the same process as by the one employed in classification, existing models
The GCM has eight parameters-c, r, b1, w1, w2, w3, w4, and w5. According to the of classification should be able to account for the data from classification transfer and model, the probability that subjects classify the stimulus Si into the category C 1 , P(C 1 /S i ), from inference transfer equally well.
We fit Medin and Schaffer's context is obtained by calculating the overall similarity between the stimulus Si and the category model (1978) and Anderson's rational model to the data (Anderson, 1990 (Anderson, , 1991 ; members in C 1 divided by the sum of overall similarity between the stimulus Si and all the Nosofsky, 1986). To fit the context model, we employed Nosofsky's Generalized Con-members of categories available to subjects (see Nosofsky, 1986, p. 42 for the modificatext Model (GCM) because of its generality and clarity (Nosofsky, 1986) . We chose the tion of the GCM to relate the model to the context model): rational model because of its proposal that the primary impetus for categorization is to maximize people's ability to make inferences about features of category members.
n il , The rational model treats the category label as another feature and assumes that it can be predicted in the same manner that the where features of objects are predicted. The purpose of this model fitting is to test the central
. assumption that subjects employ qualitatively different strategies to carry out the inference and classification tasks. In this
The similarity between the probe stimulus S i and an exemplar stimulus S j is denoted by n ij , sense, this model fitting is not intended to compare the relative efficacy of the two which decreases exponentially as a function of the discrepancy between feature values Éx ik 0 x jk É. models. The comparison between the two models is beyond the scope of the present The parameters, w k , represent the selective attention given to each feature dimension. r is paper because these models were developed to account for data from classification tasks the parameter associated with the psychological distance between feature values. c is the not from inference tasks.
The results of the model fitting for Experi-scale parameter representing overall discriminability of stimuli in a psychological space. ment 1 are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 , and are described in the following subsec-In order to reduce the number of free parameters, we fixed two parameters b 1 and r(b 1 Å tions. The results of the model fitting for Experiment 2 are shown in the Appendix. 0.5 and r Å 1) and combined c and w k . This modification yields five free parameters cw k (0 For both models, parameters were found by a random-start hill-climbing algorithm that õ cw k õ ϱ) and makes the GCM identical to Medin and Schaffer's context model (1978) nal partitions. First, the clusters emerge because objects in the world have inherent where Medin and Schaffer's similarity parameters, f , s, c, and p, correspond to the atten-qualities for clustering due to the inability to crossbreed. Second, the clusters reveal tion parameters cw k in logarithmic functions (in this setting, cw 1 Å 0ln f , cw 2 Å 0ln s, information about their members, showing, for example, the probability that a particucw 3 Å 0ln c, cw 4 Å 0ln p).
To fit inference data, we slightly extended lar object exhibits a certain feature value.
Anderson suggests that it is this second the model by treating category labels as another feature and calculated feature infer-quality of partitions that enables people to draw predictions about objects and to clasences in the same manner that classification performance was calculated. For example, sify a new object into a group (Anderson, 1990, p. 97) . when predicting classification performance, the similarity distance between a probe item To examine classification and inference performance, we calculated the probability es-(1, 1, 1, 0, 1) Å (form, size, color, position, category-label) and a category item (0, 1, 1, timated by 1, 1) was obtained by estimating the feature match excluding the category labels; in this
where P(ijÉF ) is the probability that a stimu-
lus has a feature value j on the dimension i / cw 3 Éx i3 0 x j3 É / cw 4 Éx i4 0 x j4 É. given the feature structure F, P(kÉF) is the probability that the stimulus is grouped in the Similarly, when predicting the feature value partition k given its feature structure F, and of form, for example, the similarity distance P(ijÉk) is the probability that the stimulus has between the two items was obtained by feature a feature value j on a feature dimension i given match excluding form but including category a partition k. The rational model has a coulabels; in this case pling parameter c that affects the prior probability that an item comes from a particular partition. We further introduced five paramecw 2 Éx i2 0 x j2 É / cw 3 Éx i3 0 x j3 É ters associated with four feature dimensions / cw 4 Éx i4 0 x j4 É / cw 5 Éx i5 0 x j5 É, and category labels to accommodate attention salience given to each feature dimension (we where cw 5 is an attention parameter given to treated category labels as another feature dicategory labels. To obtain psychological dis-mension). These parameters yield a new equatance associated with each feature value (i.e., tion to estimate P(ijÉk)-the probability of x ij ), the GCM requires stimulus identification displaying a feature value in a given partition data and a confusion matrix. These data were k (see Anderson, 1990, p. 116 for this modifinot available to us so that we used the arbi-cation) trary feature values (1 and 0) in each feature dimension.
Anderson's rational model is based on P(ijÉF ) Å n ij / g i n k / ͚ g i . the assumption that people form categories to maximize the predictability to features of objects (Anderson, 1991) . A main vehiTo give the model extra flexibility, we also introduced a response parameter r (the same cle of the rational model lies in the internal partitions that are formed through experi-modification can be found in Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, Mckinley and Glauthier, ence with exemplars. Anderson (1990) describes two important qualities of the inter-1994, p. 359). Thus, the probability P iA that Tables 3 and 4 for details). A similar trend appeared in the model
, fitting of Experiment 2 (see Appendix). 9 In contrast, the two models appear inappropriate to account for inference transfer data regardwhere p ia and p ib are the probability estimated less of the learning conditions. by the rational model to predict the feature In accounting for inference transfer perforvalues a and b in the ith dimension, respec-mance, for example, the modified context tively. Because the order of stimulus presenta-model produced attention parameters close to tion also affects the accountability of the ratio-the minimum value for almost all the four nal model, 40 sequences of stimulus presenta-feature dimensions except the category labels tion were generated randomly, and optimal (cw i Å 0.01, 0 õ cw k õ ϱ). The results indiparameter values were determined separately cate that the model relied on the category lafor each presentation. The results reported be-bels almost exclusively to derive inference low and the accountability score shown in Ta-judgments. Furthermore, within the range of ble 4 are based on the best fitting parameter the attention parameters the model's accountvalues obtained from one of forty sequences of stimulus presentation. 9 The poor performance observed in the two models ability measures (i.e., accountability Å 1 0 In summary, the disparity between inference and classification is clearly present in (SSE/SST)) barely exceeded the estimates made by the overall averages of the data. the results of the model fitting: the two models provided reasonably good fit to the data Clearly, given the modification suggested in this section, the algorithm employed in the from the classification transfer tasks, but failed to account for the data from the infermodified context model does not seem appropriate to account for inference transfer perfor-ence transfer tasks, at least given the modification suggested above. It may be the case mance.
Similarly, the algorithm used in the rational that the assumption of treating category labels as equivalent to category features may model appears implausible in accounting for the data from the inference transfer task. It not be warranted. Although the two models have been successful in accounting for a vaproduced the best fitting values in all three learning conditions by creating singleton par-riety of classification performance (Anderson, 1990 (Anderson, , 1991 Medin & Schaffer, 1978 ; titions for every learning stimulus (i.e., each internal partition contained only one exem-Nosofsky, 1986), these models seem to require a major modification to account for inplar). Among the 40 different patterns of randomly selected stimulus-presentation se-ference transfer data. quences, the rational model produced the GENERAL DISCUSSION best parameter values by using singleton partitions in 17 out of 40 cases in Classification
In an effort to investigate the relationship between category learning and category forLearning, 30 out of 40 cases in Inference Learning, and 34 out of 40 cases in Mixed mation, we have contrasted inference-based learning with classification-based learning. Learning. These results suggest that the model obtained the best predictions by ex-The results of the two experiments and the model fitting show that inference and classiamining each exemplar separately rather than by forming clusters, indicating that the fication require different strategies to carry them out, and, because of these strategies, accountability of the model actually decreases as the model forms internal clusters. distinct category representations arise if people learn categories by inference or by classiThis phenomenon contradicts the basic assumption of the rational model that internal fication. In particular, inference, which requires a focus on exemplar information within clusters formed by people provide a basis for feature predictions (Anderson, 1990, p. 97) . a category, helps subjects to extract family resemblance information within a category. Given the family resemblance categorystructure employed in the two experiments, As a result, categories formed by inference contain information consistent with the protothere is no reason to believe that the stimulus structure used in the two experiments deters typical values of the category members. In contrast, classification, which tends to prothe formation of partitions. To account for the inference transfer data, the two models mote a focus on a small number of diagnostic features, guides subjects to form categories may need to introduce a major modification. While we believe that fitting models of cate-consistent with rules and exceptions or concrete exemplars. gorization can provide an insight into the distinction between inference and classificaIn Experiment 1, we found that subjects' transfer performance was the best when the tion, we think that it is premature for us to develop a model of classification and infer-transfer task matched the learning task. Subjects who learned the categories by classificaence in this stage. More empirical studies and theoretical investigation should be made tion were the best in classification transfer.
Subjects who learned the categories by inferto constrain the nature of the inference process before a model of the inference task can ence were the best in inference transfer. Given Exception-feature inferences, subjects in the be developed. 
